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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the tendency that stocks perform 
relatively well in the past continue to outperform in the intermediate horizon, the so called 
(cross-sectional) momentum, has drawn substantial interests from academia and practitioners 
alike (Carhart 1997; Cooper et al. 2004; Nijman et al. 2004; Sagi & Seasholes 2007; Min & 
Kim 2016).2 Besides this well-established cross-sectional momentum, Moskowitz et al. (2012) 
document a strong time-series momentum pattern that the past 12-month return predicts the 
subsequent one-month return, which prevails in a number of asset classes (Moskowitz et al. 
2012; Georgopoulou & Wang 2016).  
More recently, Gao et al. (2018) extend the momentum literature to the field of intraday high-
frequency and uncover a striking intraday time-series predictability in the US S&P 500 
exchange-traded fund market. That is, the first half-hour return positively predicts the last half-
hour return within the same trading day.3 They argue that the intraday momentum is consistent 
with both the (Bogousslavsky 2016) model of infrequent portfolio rebalancing and the model 
of late-informed trading near the market close. 
To shed new light on the intraday momentum effect, this paper extends the empirical analysis 
to the firm level by examining a comprehensive high-frequency dataset in the Chinese A-share 
market. Our focus on the Chinese stock market is mainly motivated by its special trading 
regulation and market designs. To be specific, China has adopted a “𝑇 + 1 trading rule” since 
1995, which prevents investors from selling stocks bought on the same day (Guo et al. 2012). 
This unique trading rule, however, goes counter to the settings of the infrequent portfolio 
rebalancing model, as traders who hold an excess position in the asset could not rebalance at 
the intraday frequency.4 In other words, the 𝑇 + 1 trading rule offers an ideal setting to verify 
the rich empirical predictions of the Gao et al. (2018) model of late-informed trading.  
 
2
 The strong cross-sectional momentum pattern prevails in the international equity markets. For example, 
Rouwenhorst (1998) examined 18 European stock markets, Fama and French (2012) covered 23 developed 
markets in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, Asness et al. (2013) provided confirmatory evidence in the 
US, UK, Japan, and the EU market, and Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) covered 21 stock markets. Cross-sectional 
momentum also exists in different asset classes. See Moskowitz et al. (2012), Menkhoff et al. (2012) and Asness 
et al. (2013) for evidences in the equities, currencies, government bonds, and commodity futures markets. 
3
 Elaut et al. (2018) and Zhang et al. (2019) document similar intraday momentum effect in the FX and emerging 
markets, respectively.   
4
 The Bogousslavsky (2016) model of infrequent portfolio rebalancing assumes that a subset of infrequent traders 
rebalances at the designated frequency to generate the observed positive return predictability While it is a powerful 
theoretical model which could explain the return predictability at daily, weekly, and other frequencies, it is less 
plausible to explain the intraday pattern in China. This is because China adopts a unique “𝑇 + 1 trading rule” 
which technically forbids investors from rebalancing at the intraday frequency.  
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Along the line of the high-frequency return predictability (Heston et al. 2010; Elaut et al. 2018; 
Gao et al. 2018), our contribution to the emerging high-frequency momentum literature is at 
least threefold.  
First, in contrast to the prior work that focuses on the market level (Gao et al. 2018; Zhang et 
al. 2019), we analyse whether the intraday time-series predictability exists for individual stocks. 
Similar to findings at the aggregated level, we document a strong intraday time-series 
momentum pattern at the firm level: stock return of the first half-hour is a strong positive 
predictor for the last half-hour return at the market closure. Moreover, this firm-level return 
predictability is robust across subsamples that differ in market capitalization (and other firm 
characteristics), implying an intraday time-series trading strategy is implementable for 
individual stocks as well.  
Second, we uncover the (empirical) source of the intraday return predictability by decomposing 
the Gao et al. (2018) first half-hour return into two non-overlapping return components: the 
overnight component and the opening half-hour component. Motivated by the microstructure 
design of the Chinese stock market, in which a pre-open call auction is integrated with the 
continuous trading session(s), we explore its implications for intraday momentum. In principle, 
the pre-open call auction should facilitate price discovery as it provides more rooms for trading 
beyond normal trading sessions (Madhavan 1992). This is crucial for a market with 
heterogeneous investors, as those early-informed traders could act on the “overnight” 
informational flows in pre-open call auction before the continuous trading session starts.  
To the extent that overnight return (determined by the pre-open call market) carries significant 
price-related information, we would expect that the overnight return component positively 
predicts the price movement in the last half-hour before market closure. This is also consistent 
with the prediction of the model of late-informed trading as late-informed traders base their 
intraday trading signal on the observed overnight return that are informative. Empirically, we 
find consistent evidence: Both the panel regression and firm-by-firm regressions yield the same 
conclusion that the intraday momentum stems mainly from the overnight return component. In 
comparison, the opening half-hour return provides little, if any, predictability for the last half-
hour return during the trading day. From a practical perspective, the stronger predictive power 
of overnight return is also beneficial to all market participants, as they have more time to 
execute the intraday trading strategy throughout the day.  
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Third, we explore the interaction between firm-level informational shocks and the intraday 
momentum. As another key finding of this paper, we document a striking asymmetric pattern 
of intraday (overnight) momentum subsequent to large informational shocks. Using identified 
price jumps as the proxy for large informational shocks (see Ball and Torous (1985), Johannes 
(2004), Maheu and McCurdy (2004), and Cremers et al. (2015) for theoretical justification), 
we find the return predictability of first half-hour return or overnight return is much stronger 
following negative jump days than positive jump days. This striking asymmetric post-jump 
momentum pattern is similar to the prior (cross-sectional) momentum literature that investors 
react differently to good news and bad news (Hong et al. 2000), and can be reconciled with a 
number of real world mechanisms (or frictions) such as biased managerial disclosure of good 
news versus bad news of a firm and the existence of stringent short-sales impediments. 
Therefore, bad news travels slowly as it takes longer time for the market to digest the 
informational content of pessimist news. (Pritamani & Singal 2001; Park & Lee 2014; Brennan 
et al. 2015).  
Finally, based on a proprietary brokerage account dataset, we make the first attempt to verify 
the model predictions of the late-informed trading. Given that investors are heterogeneous in 
their ability to collect and interpret information, the key empirical prediction of the late-
informed trading is that those who trade at later time of the day (i.e., late-informed traders) are 
relatively less experienced or skilful compared to those who trade mainly in the pre-open call 
auction and/or the early trading session. Empirically, we find confirmatory evidence that there 
exists a substantial fraction of late-informed traders (i.e., approximately 15% of all active 
traders) who concentrated their trading activity in the latter-half of the trading day, and in 
particular, the last half-hour of the continuous trading session. In comparison, early-informed 
traders, defined as those traded during the pre-open call auction, comprises around 6.5% of all 
active traders. In general, we find early-informed traders have more trading experience 
(measured in years) and are better educated (i.e., bachelor degree or higher) than their late-
informed peers (See Table 8 and Table A4 in the appendix). Therefore, for late-informed 
traders who have less ability to process the overnight information (or hesitate to trade until they 
confirm the precision of the overnight information), the trading session near market close (i.e., 
the last half-hour) stands for an important timing for them to utilize their (late-learned) 
information to trade. 
In robustness tests and further analysis, we find similar evidence as in prior literature that 
intraday momentum pattern is much stronger in financial crisis than in normal periods 
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(Avramov & Hore 2017; Elaut et al. 2018; Gao et al. 2018). The magnitude of the slope 
coefficient on the first half-hour return or overnight return almost tripled during market crashes, 
indicating stronger return comovements in bad times.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 documents the data sources and 
the trading mechanisms in China. Section 3 provides the baseline results of intraday momentum 
in the Chinese stock market for the full sample and the subsamples. Section 4 provides an 
empirical decomposition to validate the sources of the intraday momentum. Section 5 further 
tests the post-jump-day effect of intraday momentum. Section 6 validates the model predictions 
of the late-informed trading. Section 7 performs a battery of robustness tests and further 
analyses. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and Trade Mechanisms 
2.1. Data Sources 
We compile a high-frequency dataset of the Chinese A-shares over the sample period from 
January 1996 to May 2018. Our data source is from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) 
database via the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). For 
comprehensiveness, we retrieve all Chinese A-shares available in the TRTH database, which 
includes 3,596 stocks. We apply a uniform data filtering rule. That is, we require a stock to 
have at least a full year’s data (corresponding to 244 trading days, the average annual trading 
days over the entire sample period) to be included in our final sample. After applying this filter 
rule, our final sample contains 3,224 valid stocks in total. This includes 1,271 stocks listed in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), which spans from January 1996 to May 2018; 467 
stocks in the main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which spans from 
November 2001 to May 2018; 852 stocks in the SME board of SZSE, which spans from June 
2004 to May 2018; 634 stocks in the ChiNext board of SZSE, which spans from November 
2009 to May 2018.  
Note China has very rigid rules for stocks to be listed on the different boards of the security 
exchanges, which is mainly based on firm size. According to the listing rule, all A-shares in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange are on the Main board. The same applies to all stocks on the 
Main board of SZSE. In general, stocks on the Main board need to have at least 30 million 
shares and more than 50 million Chinese yuan (CNY) share capital before IPO, and more than 
25% tradable shares after being listed; stocks on the SME board need to have at least 30 million 
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shares before the IPO, more than 50 million CNY share capital after being listed; stocks on the 
ChiNext board need to have more than 30 million CNY share capital after being listed. 
Following Gao et al. (2018), we calculate the intraday return at each half-hour interval for our 
empirical analysis in the following section. The full description of the variable construction is 
available in Appendix A.1.  
 
2.2. Trade Mechanism 
Since its inception in 1990, the Chinese A-share market functions as a pure order-driven market. 
SHSE and SZSE adopt a fully automated and screen-based trading platform (i.e., an electronic 
open Limit Order Book (LOB)) to consolidate all the trades and quotes during the trading hours, 
with no designated market makers (specialists).  
Besides the continuously trading system (i.e., LOB), the trading mechanism in the Chinese A-
share market is integrated with a 10-minute pre-open call auction held between 9:15 and 9:25 
(Gerace et al. 2015).5 The pre-open call auction is designed to help uncover the opening price, 
which is the clearing price that maximizes the trading volume based on all the collected limit 
orders during the pre-open session. Orders that are not executed in the pre-open call auction 
are automatically transferred to the period of continuous trading.  
Following the pre-open call auction, there are two normal trading sessions, during which 
continuous trading is conducted through the submission of limit or market orders. During the 
continuous trading sessions, (unexecuted) limit orders can be modified or cancelled. The 
morning trading session starts at 9:30 for two consecutive hours, and then stops at 11:30 for a 
90-minute lunch break. The afternoon trading session resumes at 13:00. There is no special 
trading mechanism to close the morning session or open the afternoon session. In SHSE, the 
afternoon session lasts for another two consecutive hours and closes at 15:00 for that day. 
Accordingly, the closing price in SHSE is generated by taking a volume-weighted average of 
the trading prices of the final minute of the afternoon session. In SZSE, however, the afternoon 
session stops at 14:57, which is followed by a 3-minute closing call auction between 14:57 and 
15:00 to determine the closing price of the day.6 
 
5
 During the 10-minute pre-open call auction, investors could place limit orders. However, no orders can be 
modified or withdrawn between 9:20 and 9:25. 
6
 The transition from continuous trading to the closing call auction is almost “unnoticeable”, as all remaining limit 
orders at 14:57 are routed automatically to the closing auction. In addition, investors could submit new limit orders 
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3. Intraday Momentum at the Firm Level 
3.1. Baseline Results 
In this section, we test whether the intraday momentum pattern exists at the firm level. That is, 
whether the first half-hour return (denoted as 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡) is able to predict the last half-hour return 
of the trading day 𝑡 for an individual stock.  
Following Gao et al. (2018), we consider the following predictive regression model:  𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑡 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽14:30 × 𝑟14:30,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑡, [3.1] 
where 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 is the first half-hour return calculated using the close price of the prior trading day 
and the stock price at 10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 is the penultimate half-hour 
return calculated using the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of the current trading day. The 
dependent variable 𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡 is the last half-hour return, which is calculated from the stock prices 
at 14:30 and 15:00 (i.e., market close) of the current trading day. 𝐹𝐸 denote the terms for the 
firm-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. The inclusion of the penultimate half-hour return is 
to control the very short-term return predictability (i.e., autocorrelation) at the intraday level. 
Therefore, the slope coefficients, 𝛽1𝑠𝑡 and 𝛽14:30, measure the predictability of the first half-
hour return and the penultimate half-hour return on the last half-hour return, respectively.  
[ insert table 1 here ] 
Table 1 presents the estimation results of the panel regression with fixed effects. The first 
model specification (column 1) represents the univariate case with the first half-hour return as 
the predictive variable. As it stands, the slope coefficient on the first half-hour return amounts 
to 1.92 and is statistically significant at the 1% level.7 The second model specification (column 
2) represents the univariate case with the penultimate half-hour return as the predictive variable. 
Its slope coefficient amounts to 6.16 and is also highly statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The third model specification (column 3) represents the bivariate case with both the first half-
hour return and the penultimate half-hour return as the predictive variables. It should be noted 
 
during the 3-minute closing auction. After submission, these orders can no longer be modified or withdrawn 
during the closing auction period.   
7
 To be conservative, we do not annualize the slope coefficients in our predictive regressions. Therefore, our slope 
coefficients are in general smaller than those in Gao et al. (2018). In fact, a one percent change of the first half-
hour return would indicate an annualized 4.68 percent change of the last half-hour return, which is significant 
from a pure economics perspective.  
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after accounting for the very short-term return predictability (i.e., penultimate half-hour return), 
the predictive power of the first half-hour return on the last half-hour return remains strong 
with a coefficient of 1.83, which is significant at the 1% level.  
In terms of the model fit, the adjusted R-squares are 0.16%, 0.37%, and 0.51% for the three 
model specifications, respectively.8 This is consistent with the prior findings in Zhang et al. 
(2019) that the penultimate half-hour return has stronger return predictability than the first half-
hour return in China, which is contrary to the pattern in the US (Gao et al. 2018). In fact, both 
return predictors remain strong in predicting the last half-hour return, as the adjusted R-square 
increased from 0.37% to 0.51% in the bivariate case. This, coupled with the significant 
coefficient of the first half-hour return, implies that the information content of the first half-
hour return is not subsumed by the penultimate half-hour return.9  
To sum up, intraday momentum effect remains strong at the firm level in the Chinese stock 
market: The first half-hour return strongly predicts the last half-hour return for individual 
stocks. 
 
3.2. Subsample Analysis 
Results in the prior subsection confirms the strong intraday time-series momentum effect at the 
firm level in the Chinese A-share market. In this part, we re-test the intraday time-series pattern 
with subsamples. This is motivated by the empirical findings in Hong et al. (2000) that the 
profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with firm size, as the smallest stocks are 
influenced the most by return momentum. Our aim is to verify whether the same pattern holds 
at the intraday frequency.  
Following the listing rules in the Chinese A-share market, we assign stocks to three different 
groups based on their board of listing: The Main board refers to all stocks listed in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and those in the main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The SME board 
 
8
 The model fit is reasonable considering that the predictive regressions usually have relatively low 𝑅2 at the high 
frequency. For example, Yamamoto (2012) adopts the intraday technical analysis of individual stocks on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange and finds the joint regression explanatory power of lagged midpoint return, order flow, 
and order imbalance ranges from 0.21% to 0.50% for different size groups. Renault (2017) uses intraday online 
sentiment data to predict the half hour return in the U.S. stock market and find the regression explanatory power 
for the first half-hour return, twelfth half-hour return, and the last half-hour return varies from -0.14% to 1.35%. 
9
 In unreported analysis, we also control for the first half-hour return after the lunch break. The intraday 
momentum effect remains robust. For parsimonious purpose, we retain in our baseline model only the first half-
hour and the penultimate half-hour returns. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional 
robustness check.  
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consists of all A-shares that fulfill the criteria of small and medium enterprises. The ChiNext 
board consists of all A-shares identified as small/tiny enterprises engaged in independent 
innovations and/or other growing venture enterprises. The existence of the three alternative 
boards reflects China’s multi-tier capital market system and offers a simple yet rigid 
classification of the firm size (see footnote 9). Admittedly, an alternative size-based 
classification would be to divide all listed firms into size-tercile groups based on the market 
value of equity as in Han and Li (2017). In fact, our findings remain unchanged under the 
alternative size classification method.  
Table A1. in the appendix provides the market statistics of the three boards of the Chinese A-
share market. A number of salient features emerge from the table. First, from the time 
dimension there exhibits strong growth for all the three boards, as reflected in the number of 
listed firms, total market capitalization, total number of shares outstanding, and total trading 
volume. Second, there exhibits a size pattern, as stocks in the Main board have the largest (total) 
market capitalization, number of shares outstanding, and trading volume, which is followed by 
the SME board and the ChiNext board. This provides support for us to sort stocks into size 
groups based on their board of listing. Third, there exhibits two dramatic market downturns 
(i.e., financial crises) as in the year of 2008 and 2016 during our sample period, which we 
examine in more detail in Section 7.  
To uncover the intraday momentum pattern in the cross section, we re-test the predictive 
regression with the subsamples.  
[ insert table 2 here ] 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the panel regression of the three subsamples with 
fixed effects (i.e., equation [3.1]). Looking across the three groups, there exhibits a size pattern, 
as the slope coefficient on the first half-hour return increases monotonically from the Main 
board to the SME board and to the ChiNext board, whether we control for the effect of the 
penultimate half-hour return or not. In addition, the explanatory power also increases 
monotonically from the Main board to the SME board and to the ChiNext board (0.12%, 0.24% 
and 0.31% in the univariate case). When examining the autocorrelation effect due to the 
penultimate half-hour return, we find a similar monotonically increasing pattern for the slope 
coefficient and the explanatory power.  
Overall, we confirm that intraday time-series momentum exists in all three subgroups, and the 
penultimate half-hour return remains a strong return predictor as compared to the first half-
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hour return. Moreover, we more or less confirm the size effect of the intraday time-series 
momentum in the cross section, as the return predictability in the SME and ChiNext boards are 
stronger than that in the Main board. In other words, stocks with smaller market capitalization 
exhibit larger intraday momentum pattern over time, which is consistent with prior literature 
such as Rouwenhorst (1998), Hong et al. (2000), Chui et al. (2010), and Novy-Marx (2012), 
among others that studying momentum at the low frequency (i.e., monthly).  
 
4. Decomposition of the First Half-Hour Return  
4.1. Overnight Momentum versus Opening Half-hour Momentum 
In this section, we decompose the Gao et al. (2018) first half-hour return into two non-
overlapping components: the overnight return component and the opening half-hour return 
component. The former is defined as the price movement from the closing price of the prior 
trading day to the opening price as of 9:30, while the latter measures the intraday price 
movement between 9:30 and 10:00 of the current day. The partition into the two non-
overlapping components is mainly motivated for two reasons.  
First, from a pure market microstructure perspective, the two return components stem from 
vastly different trading mechanisms. As is explained in Subsection 2.2, the overnight 
component (or opening price) is determined by the 10-minute pre-open call auction, which 
offers the earliest trading opportunities (beyond the normal trading hours) to explore the 
informational flows during the overnight period (i.e., in between the market closure of the prior 
trading day and the opening of the continuous trading in the current trading day). In principle, 
call markets can aggregate information by pooling orders and thus facilitate price discovery 
even when continuous markets may fail due to high information asymmetry (Madhavan 1992). 
The (Walrasian-type) call auction matches supply and demand (i.e., limit buy and sell orders) 
directly by setting a uniform clearing price (i.e., the opening price) to maximize the transaction 
volume. Thus, it is claimed to facilitate price discovery by lowering execution and market 
impact costs, eliminating the risk of front-running and informational disclosure, and lowering 
price manipulation (Economides & Schwartz 1995). In comparison, the opening half-hour 
return is determined in the continuous trading sessions (i.e., the LOB), in which 
(early-)informed traders tend to “disguise” their trading motive. Moreover, trading in the 
continuous session could also be related to other motives such as liquidity provision (i.e., 
earning the bid-ask spread). In other words, the opening half-hour component could be more 
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of a mixed price signal. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the two non-overlapping 
components offer different price-related information, which might lead to the documented 
intraday periodicity. 
Second, from the perspective of the model of late-informed trading, it helps to identify which 
trading signal do the late-informed traders act upon. Within the model of late-informed trading, 
investors are heterogeneous in their ability to collect and interpret information. Those who have 
better skills to process the overnight information (i.e., early-informed traders) can act early in 
the morning trading session and even the pre-open call auction. However, for those who have 
less ability to process the overnight information or those who hesitate to trade until they 
confirm the precision of the overnight information, the last half-hour trading period stands for 
another important timing for them to utilize their (late-learned) information to trade, and thus 
exploiting the informational content. Therefore, it helps to identify which return component is 
the (major) trading signal utilized by the late-informed traders.  
To test (separately) the predictive power of the overnight component and the opening half-hour 
component, we adopt the following predictive regression model.  𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑜𝑣 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 + 𝛽10:00 × 𝑟10:00,𝑡 + 𝛽14:30 × 𝑟14:30,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸+𝜀𝑡 [4.1] 
where 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡  denotes the overnight component calculates from the closing price of the prior 
trading day to the opening price of the current day, while 𝑟10:00,𝑡  the opening half-hour 
component calculated from the stock prices at 9:30 and 10:00 of the current day. The 
penultimate half-hour return, 𝑟14:30,𝑡, is calculated from the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of 
the current trading day. The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡, is the last half-hour return within the 
day, calculated from the stock prices at 14:30 and 15:00. 𝐹𝐸 denotes the terms of fixed effects. 
Again, we require a firm to have at least one full year’s available data (i.e., 244 trading days, 
the average annual trading days in China) to be included in the panel regression. The slope 
coefficients 𝛽𝑜𝑣  and 𝛽10:00  measure the predictability of the two non-overlapping return 
components on the last half-hour return, respectively. 
[ insert table 3 here ] 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the panel regression with fixed effects. The first 
model specification (column 1) represents the univariate predictive regression with the 
overnight return as the sole predictive variable. Compared to the univariate case of the first 
half-hour return in column 1 of table 1, the impact of the overnight return component is much 
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stronger, both in the magnitude of the slope coefficient (from 1.92 to 2.88) and in terms of the 
explanatory power (from 0.16% to 0.22%). After controlling the overnight component, the 
opening half-hour component exhibits some positive predictability on the last half-hour return 
(column 2). However, its influence is much weaker as its slope coefficient is approximately 
one-fifth of that of the overnight component. Moreover, adding the opening half-hour 
component only slightly increases the explanatory power from 0.22% to 0.23%. Column 3 
takes into account the impact of the penultimate half-hour return when testing the predictive 
power of the overnight return component. The impact of the overnight component remains 
virtually intact with a slope coefficient of 2.78 that is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, there exhibits strong short-term return predictability induced by the penultimate 
half-hour return, as its slope coefficient is 6.02, much larger in magnitude than the overnight 
component. The model fit also jumps dramatically from 0.22% to 0.57%. Finally, the last 
column considers simultaneously the overnight component, the opening half-hour component, 
and the penultimate half-hour return. The results are highly similar, as we document a strong 
short-term predictability (due to the penultimate half-hour return) and intraday momentum due 
to the overnight component.  
 
4.2. Alternative Versions of the Opening Half-hour Return 
To shed more light on the empirical source(s) of intraday momentum, we also test alternative 
versions of the opening half-hour return. That is, we define alternative versions of opening 
half-hour return using the price movements during the first 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 minutes in 
the continuous trading session, respectively. Gao et al. (2018) also test similar alternative 
definitions of first half-hour return for intraday momentum, but they do not separate the 
overnight component from these alternative measures.  
Again, our aim is to test the predictive power of the overnight component and the alternative 
opening half-hour component, while controlling the short-term autocorrelation (i.e., the 
penultimate half-hour return).  
[ insert table 4 here ] 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the panel regression with fixed effects. Interestingly, 
as we retain the same model specification but use alternative versions of the opening half-hour 
component, the slope coefficient on the (alternative) opening half-hour component flips sign 
from negative to positive. The changing sign of the slope coefficients is consistent with the fact 
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that trading in the continuous session is related to different motives such as information 
digestion and/or liquidity provision, which results in a mixed price signal for the last half-hour 
return.  
In comparison, the slope coefficients on the overnight component and the penultimate half-
hour return retain the same positive sign and magnitude, implying non-overlapping price-
related information for the last half-hour return.  
Overall, when we interpret the results from Tables 3 and 4 collectively, it is clear that the 
overnight return (determined from the pre-open call auction) is the main source of the intraday 
momentum effect. In fact, after controlling the penultimate half-hour return, the overnight 
return has a larger slope coefficient than that of the first-half hour return (in Table 1). This is 
consistent with the projection from the microstructure perspective that trading in the pre-open 
call market is more likely to be informational driven, which results in a more reliable price 
signal with stronger predictive power. From the perspective of the model of late-informed 
trading, it also implies that the overnight component is (possibly) the more reliable trading 
signal that the late-informed traders could act upon, given that the predictive sign of the opening 
half-hour returns varies under alternative measures. Finally, it should be noted that from the 
practical perspective, the stronger the “overnight momentum”, the more trading opportunities 
left for traders as they would have more time to execute trades during the continuous trading 
sessions. Therefore, in the remaining part of this paper, we present the results for both the first 
half-hour return and the overnight return. 
 
5. Intraday Momentum and Informational Shocks 
To shed more light on the (possible) link between intraday momentum and late-informed 
trading, we verify whether there exists a dynamic intraday time-series predictability. For 
example, Hong et al. (2000) find negative firm-specific information diffuses gradually across 
the investing public, leading to a stronger momentum pattern for loser stocks. To the extent 
that intraday high-frequency momentum reflects the tendency that late-informed traders 
commence trading based on the observed price signal, the informational role of the first half-
hour return (or the overnight return) might differ between good and bad information being 
disclosed to the market. Our logic is as follows. As long as managers prefer higher to lower 
stock prices, they will have the strong tendency to disclose positive news about the firm more 
efficiently (and possibly in a more unambiguous manner). Therefore, following the disclosure 
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of positive news, the informational role of first half-hour return (or overnight return) will 
become weaker (i.e., a smaller post-event intraday momentum effect) as there is less 
informational uncertainty about the firm. On the contrary, managers would not have the same 
motivation to disclose the negative news about the firms to the public. Even if the managerial 
disclosure of negative news is in the same unbiased manner as for positive news, it might still 
take longer time for the investing public to digest the informational content of the negative 
news due to the impediment of short-sales constraints (Hong et al. 2000). Based on these 
arguments, the intraday momentum effect might be stronger following negative news about the 
firm. To sum up, our main testable hypotheses on the dynamic intraday momentum effect are: 
Hypothesis 1a. Following the disclosure of positive information, the intraday time-series 
predictability gets weaker than that of a normal day.  
Hypothesis 1b. Following the disclosure of negative information, the intraday time-series 
predictability gets stronger than that of a normal day.  
To verify the dynamic role of intraday momentum following informational disclosure, we rely 
on observed price jumps as the proxy for the ex post large informational shocks to the individual 
stocks. Jumps in asset price have long been considered as (unexpected) informational shocks 
(see Ball and Torous (1985), Johannes (2004), Maheu and McCurdy (2004), and Cremers et al. 
(2015) for theoretical justification). Jiang and Zhu (2017) also use price jumps as proxy of 
price-relevant informational arrivals and find a strong short-term momentum pattern at daily 
and weekly frequency. Therefore, we use intraday 5-minute returns and adopt the recursive 
intraday jump detection method based on Andersen et al. (2012) to identify positive and 
negative jump days. A positive (negative) jump day is defined as the date that has a positive 
(negative) jump return if there is only one intraday price jump during that day. In case there 
are more than one jump within the day, we calculate the (daily) cumulative jump return and 
define it as a positive (negative) jump day if the cumulative jump return is above (below) zero 
for that day. To save space, a full walk-through of the jump identification method is available 
in Appendix A.2.  
 [ insert table 5 here ] 
Table 5 provides the summary statistics of the cumulative jump returns on positive and 
negative jump days respectively. For comparison purpose, we also present the corresponding 
statistics for all sample days. We adopt the same criteria as in prior sections by restricting to 
stocks with at least one-year available data (i.e., 244 trading days) in the analysis. The 
14 
 
cumulative jump returns on positive jump days have an average value of 2.13% and a standard 
deviation of 1.59%. Similarly, the cumulative jump returns on negative jump days have an 
average value of -2.09% and a standard deviation of 1.55%. In comparison, the average daily 
return over the sample period is only 0.04%. Therefore, we confirm that price jumps in our 
sample represent substantial price movement within the day and may indicates valuable price-
related information flows to the stock market. Looking across the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 
95% quantile values, the cumulative jump returns on positive jump days ranges from 0.52% to 
5.17%, while the corresponding statistics on negative jump days ranges from -5.55% to -0.55%. 
It seems that price jumps on positive jump days and negative jump days have analogous 
characteristics (i.e., the magnitude of the price jumps), except in different directions (i.e., the 
sign of the jump return). The only notable difference is that there are slightly more positive 
jump days than negative jump days during our sample period, as the ratio of the number of 
positive jump days to the total trading days is 14.09% compared to 10.73% for the ratio of 
negative jump days.  
Empirically, we study the interaction between price jumps and intraday momentum via the 
following model specifications.  𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑡 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝐽 × 𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝐽 × 𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡+ 𝛽14:30 × 𝑟14:30,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑡 
and 𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑜𝑣 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝐽 × 𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝐽 × 𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡+ 𝛽14:30 × 𝑟14:30,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑡 
[5.1] 
 
[5.2] 
where 𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡, 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡, 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡, 𝑟14:30,𝑡, and 𝐹𝐸 are defined similarly as in table 1 and 2. 𝑃𝐽 (𝑁𝐽) is 
the positive (negative) post-jump-day dummy which equals one if the prior trading day is 
detected as a positive (negative) jump day. It should be noted that the above two equations 
retain the same predictive flavor as before, because we are using the information set that is 
available before the last half-hour trading period at day 𝑡 . The slope coefficients on the 
interaction terms 𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡  (𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡) and 𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡  (𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡) capture the incremental 
effect on intraday (overnight) momentum subsequent to the positive and negative jump days.  
[ insert table 6 here ] 
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the dynamic intraday momentum effect. The first 
two columns use the overnight returns to interact with the post-jump-day dummies with and 
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without the penultimate half-hour return as the control variable in the model. Given that 
substantial favourable or detrimental information about the firm is revealed to the market (as 
manifested by the jump dummies), we document a striking asymmetric post-jump intraday 
momentum pattern: Following a positive jump day, the intraday momentum pattern over the 
next day is weakened as the slope coefficient on the interaction term is strongly negative with 
a value of -2.28 that is significantly at the 1% level. The total intraday momentum effect 
subsequent to a positive jump day is thus only 0.62 (2.88 − 2.28), indicating a much weaker 
time-series predictability after positive information disclosure to the market. In a sharp contrast, 
however, subsequent to a negative jump day, the intraday momentum effect is strengthened 
greatly as the slope coefficient on the interaction term amounts to 2.53 which is highly 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, the total intraday momentum effect following negative jump 
days is approximately 5.41 (2.88 + 2.53), implying a much stronger intraday predictability 
subsequent to a negative jump day than a normal day (with no price jumps). These dynamic 
patterns remain unchanged when we control the effect of return autocorrelation by including 
the penultimate half-hour returns in the regression model (column 2).  
The next two columns in table 6 list the results when we use the first half-hour return as the 
predicting variable in the regression. As it stands, we find a similar asymmetric pattern that 
subsequent to a positive jump day, the intraday momentum is much weaker than following a 
normal trading day. In comparison, subsequent to a negative jump day, the overnight 
momentum effect intensified dramatically as compared to a normal trading day.  
[ insert table 7 here ] 
Table 7 provides further evidence on the asymmetric pattern of the post-jump intraday 
momentum effect. We generate alternative positive and negative post-jump dummies, which 
have the value of one for the one-day, two-day, and three-day event window following a 
positive or negative jump day. Therefore, the slope coefficients on the interaction term 𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 (𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡) and 𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 (𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡) capture the incremental effect on intraday 
(overnight) momentum averaged over these different post-jump event window. As expected, 
the averaged incremental effect due to the positive or negative informational shocks weakens 
over the longer event window, suggesting that the market has gradually incorporated the new 
price-relevant information over time. In other words, the intraday momentum effect gradually 
reverts back to its normal level subsequent to a positive or negative jump day. 
16 
 
The above striking asymmetric pattern over the one-, two-, and three-day post-jump event 
window lends strong support to our testable hypotheses (Hypothesis 1a and 1b) that the 
intraday momentum effect is stronger following negative news about the firm. It is quite similar 
to the (cross-sectional) momentum pattern documented in Hong et al. (2000) who posit that 
bad news travels slowly in the financial market, and therefore, the cross-sectional momentum 
pattern is more pronounced after pessimistic information revealed to the market. Other studies 
have also found that market participants react differently to positive information and negative 
information (Pritamani & Singal 2001; Jiang et al. 2011; Park & Lee 2014; Brennan et al. 
2015). Our evidence provides more direct support along this line, as it is more of the time-
series nature for one single asset. In other words, the asymmetric reaction to negative news 
exists for individual stocks, as it takes longer time for investors to digest the informational 
content of bad news, which leads to a more salient intraday time-series predictability.  
 
6. Individual Investor Account and Late-Informed Trading  
In principle, the intraday momentum could be attributed to both the (Bogousslavsky 2016) 
model of infrequent portfolio rebalancing and the Gao et al. (2018) model of late-informed 
trading near the market close. As is explained in the introduction section, China adopts a unique 
“𝑇 + 1 trading rule”, which prevents investors from selling stocks bought on the same day. 
This unique trading rule, however, goes counter to the settings of the infrequent portfolio 
rebalancing model, as traders who hold an excess position in the asset could not rebalance at 
the intraday frequency. The “𝑇 + 1 trading rule” also precludes the rebalancing trading due to  
aversion of overnight risk in Elaut et al. (2018), as those who purchase the asset could not sell 
on the same day. In other words, the 𝑇 + 1 trading rule offers an ideal setting to empirically 
verify the (rich) predictions of the model of late-informed trading as suggested in Gao et al. 
(2018).  
Within the model of late-informed trading, investors are heterogeneous in their ability to collect 
and interpret information. Those who have better skills to process the overnight information 
can act early in the morning trading session and even the pre-open call auction. However, for 
those who have less ability to process the overnight information or those who hesitate to trade 
until they confirm the precision of the overnight information, the last half-hour trading period 
stands for another important timing for them to utilize their (late-learned) information to trade, 
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and thus exploiting the informational content. Based on these arguments, our main testable 
hypothesis on the late-informed trading is: 
Hypothesis 2. Late-informed traders are relatively less experienced or skilful compared to 
those who trade mainly in the pre-open call auction and/or the early trading session.  
To empirically validate the above hypothesis of the late-informed trading model, we rely on a 
proprietary investor account dataset obtained from a large brokerage firm in China.10 This 
unique dataset contains all the trading records in November 2014 for the members of individual 
investors that hold a brokerage account with the firm. We are aware that there are several 
limitations regarding our investor account data. First, the sampling period only spans for one 
month (i.e., November 2014). Second, it does not include institutional investors’ trading 
activity. However, the bottom line is that analysing the investor account data provides us direct 
evidence on the late-informed trading model which otherwise would not be testable.   
Panel A of Table 8 provides average trading behaviour of different investor types. During the 
20 trading days in November 2014, there are totalling 120,608 active investors who have traded 
at least once during the sampling period. Among those active traders, only 7,896 investors have 
actually traded during the pre-open call auction, and we classify these active investors as early-
informed traders. The relatively small number of early-informed traders is consistent with the 
relatively small transaction volume in the pre-open call auction. 11 
In comparison, we find that there are 18,281 individual investors who have never traded during 
the pre-open call auction and the opening half-hour trading period (i.e., 9:30 to 10:00). We 
classify these investors as late-informed investors, which is consistent with the definitions in 
the late-informed trading model. These late-informed traders forfeit the trading opportunity in 
the pre-open call auction session and also the opening half-hour trading session when the 
trading volume is the largest within the day. Interestingly, the number of investors who only 
trade after 10:00 is more than two times that who traded in the pre-open call auction, reinforces 
the importance of the late-informed trading in the Chinese stock market.  
 
10
 The brokerage firm is a listed firm in China that provides a comprehensive securities-related services, including 
securities brokerage, investment consulting, financial advisory related to securities trading, and securities 
investment activities for investors, and it is rated as an A-class brokerage firm by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) in 2018. 
11
 However, this ex post measure is probably an understatement as we only observe those who “successfully” 
transacted during the pre-open call market. We cannot rule out the possibility that some more investors could have 
submitted limit orders during the pre-open call auction, but not get those orders transacted. 
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When we partition the number of trades within the day into subperiods, we again find strong 
systematic difference across the two investor groups (Panel A). Early-informed traders not 
only participate the pre-open call auction, they also concentrate their trades within the first half-
hour continuous trading session, as 26.32% of their trades occurred between 9:30 and 10:00, 
while only 11.15% of their trades occurred in the last half-hour of day. Late-informed traders 
behaves differently: They not only forfeit the trading opportunity in the pre-open call auction 
and the first half-hour continuous trading session, but also concentrate their trades in the last 
half-hour trading session (i.e., 32.33%). More generally, more than 70% of their trades happen 
in the afternoon session (i.e., after 13:00).   
To shed more light on the investor trading behaviour, we then compare the personal 
characteristics of all active traders, the early-informed traders, and the late-informed traders in 
Panel B of Table 8. It seems that early-informed traders are more likely to be experienced ones 
(defined as investors who have at least 10-year trading experience), as their proportion is 
47.92%. In comparison, the late-informed traders tend to be relatively inexperienced, as the 
proportion of having at least 10-trading experience is only 38.58%. When compared with the 
proportion of experienced investors in all active investors, it is clear that early-informed (late-
informed) traders are more likely to be experienced (inexperienced) ones as demonstrated by 
the two-sample 𝑡-test with the total sample (i.e., all active investors).  
Similarly, 20.71% of the early-informed traders are better educated, as compared to 18.49% in 
the late-informed group. The two-sample 𝑡-tests demonstrate that early-informed traders tend 
to have stronger educational background as compared to all active traders, while there is no 
systematic difference between late-informed traders and all active traders. Calvet et al. (2009) 
use households’ educational background as a proxy of financial sophistication, and established 
an inverse relation with “financial mistakes”. In that sense, we have good reasons to believe 
that early-informed (late-informed) traders are relatively more (less) sophisticated or skilled.  
Other investor characteristics also reveal that early-informed traders are more likely to be male 
traders (47.09%) than late-informed traders (34.70%). Another systematic difference is that 
early-informed traders tend to have relatively high risk tolerance than late-informed traders.12  
For robustness, we also perform logit regression to explain the probability of being an early-
informed (late-informed) trader with the personal characteristics in Table 8. The coefficients 
 
12
 Risk tolerance is measured through the required questionnaire when opening a client account with the brokerage 
firm.   
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on trading experience, educational background (bachelor degree or higher) all have the 
expected signs and are highly significant at the 1% level (See Table A4 in appendix).  
Overall, based on the unique investor-account data, we are able to uncover a number of 
interesting empirical patterns:  
First, there exists a substantial fraction of late-informed traders (i.e., approximately 15% of all 
active traders) who concentrated their trading activity in the latter-half of the trading day, and 
in particular, the last half-hour of the continuous trading session.  
Second, compared to early-informed traders, late-informed traders tend to be less experienced 
or sikllful (i.e., relatively less well-educated), which is consistent with the conjecture of the 
late-informed trading hypothesis (Hypothesis 2).  
Overall, these salient features of investor heterogeneity in China are consistent with the 
predictions of the late-informed trading model that late-informed traders rely on the overnight 
returns or first half-hour returns, as one of the informational sources, to decide on the trading 
directions before the market closure.  
 
7. Robustness and Further Analyses 
7.1. Firm-by-firm Evidence of Intraday Momentum using the First Half-hour Return 
In this subsection, we re-test the intraday return predictability of the first half-hour return based 
on firm-by-firm time-series regressions (see equation [3.1]). That is, we perform time-series 
regression for each individual firm in our dataset and report the aggregated firm-lever results.  
Table A2. presents the aggregated firm-level evidence for the full sample and the three 
subsamples. When controlling for the effect of return autocorrelation (i.e., the penultimate half-
hour return), the average value of the slope coefficient on the first half-hour return is 1.87 and 
the median value is slightly higher with 1.93. In addition, the average Newey West 𝑡-statistics 
amounts to 1.58, which is statistically significant at the 10% level (based on the null hypothesis 
of the one-sided 𝑡-test that the slope coefficient is larger than zero). Among the 3,224 firms, 
more than 90% of the firms have a positive slope coefficient on the first half-hour return. 
Moreover, the slope coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
are more than 38%, 48%, and 60%, respectively, indicating strong intraday momentum effect 
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at the firm level. 13 We find similar patterns for the short-term return autocorrelation (i.e., the 
penultimate half-hour return) with the individual firms.  
Table A2. also presents the aggregated firm-level evidence of the three subgroups (i.e., Main, 
SME, and ChiNext). After controlling the penultimate half-hour returns, we, again, document 
a strong intraday time-series predictability of the first half-hour return across the three 
subgroups. When examining the proportion of significant slope coefficients of the first half-
hour return, there seems no discernible difference across the three subgroups. The only 
noticeable difference lies in the average explanatory power of the predictive model, which 
increases monotonically from 0.90% to 1.41% and to 1.65% for the Main, SME, and ChiNext 
board, respectively.  
 
7.2. Firm-by-firm Evidence of Intraday Momentum using the Overnight Return 
In this subsection, we re-perform the firm-by-firm time-series regressions to verify the intraday 
time-series predictability using the overnight return as the key predictor. Table A3. presents 
the aggregated firm-level evidence. As it stands, the overnight return remains a strong return 
predictor at the intraday frequency. When we control for the effect of the penultimate half-hour 
return, the overnight return still has a significant positive influence on the last half-hour return, 
as the average and median of the slope coefficient on overnight return amount to 2.81 and 2.78, 
respectively. Moreover, the average Newey West 𝑡-statistic is 1.78 (significant at the 5% level) 
and is higher than that of the penultimate half-hour return. More importantly, more than 92% 
of the listed firms have a positive slope coefficient on the overnight return, higher than that of 
the first half-hour return in Table A2. The slope coefficients on overnight return that are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are more than 45%, 55%, and 67%, 
respectively.14 This is consistent with the evidence in section 4 that the intraday momentum 
effect stems mainly from its overnight return component. In fact, comparing the magnitude of 
the corresponding slope coefficients (or adjusted R-square) in tables A.2. and A.3., it seems 
 
13
 To be specific, the null hypothesis of intraday momentum is the slope coefficient of the first half-hour return is 
larger than zero. Therefore, we use the one-sided 𝑡 test to determine the significant level of each coefficient.  >0 ∗, > 0 ∗∗, and > 0 ∗∗∗ denote that the Newey West 𝑡-statistic is above 1.28, 1.645, and 1.96, respectively (i.e., 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level). 
14
 In unreported analysis, we find that little return predictability of the opening half-hour return. In fact, the average 
Newey West 𝑡-statistic of the opening half-hour return is only 0.39, indicating that the return component from 
9:30 to 10:00 offer little, if any, predictive power for the last half-hour return within the day. The percentage of 
firms that have significantly positive coefficient on the term 𝑟10:00,𝑡 amount to around 8%, 13%, and 21% at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, much lower than those of overnight return and penultimate half-hour return.  
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that the overnight return component is more powerful in predicting the last half-hour return 
than the first half-hour return that includes the remaining return component from 9:30 to 10:00.  
Table A3 also presents the aggregated firm-level evidence for overnight returns across the 
three subgroups. Again we find a robust pattern that the overnight component is the main driver 
of the intraday time-series predictor after controlling the penultimate half-hour returns. In 
general the overnight component has stronger predictability than its predecessor, the first half-
hour return that contains the opening half-hour return component. The average explanatory 
power of the predictive model is in general larger than its counterpart with the first half-hour 
return, except for the case of ChiNext.  
 
7.3. Further Analyses  
We also perform two additional analyses to better understand the features of intraday 
momentum in China.15  
First, we test the dynamic relation between intraday predictability and financial crises. Over 
the entire sample period, there are two notable crises which earn their names in the Chinese 
financial history. Namely, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and the more recent 2015-2016 
Chinese “stock disaster”. Gao et al. (2018) and Elaut et al. (2018) both find that the intraday 
momentum effect strengthens during the financial crisis, which is reflected by the increasing 
magnitude of the slope coefficient and the explanatory power of the predicting model. To test 
the above notion, we generate a crisis dummy, denoted as 𝐹𝐶, to test its interaction with the 
first half-hour return or the overnight return in predicting the last half-hour returns during the 
trading day. The crisis dummy equals one for the sample date ranges from 16 October 2007 to 
18 September 2008 and from 12 Jun 2015 to 29 February 2016, and zero otherwise. The 
empirical results are similar to prior findings in Gao et al. (2018) and Elaut et al. (2018) that 
intraday momentum is more pronounced when market is in stressful states with increased return 
commonality. The total intraday momentum during crisis periods (i.e., the sum of the slope 
coefficient of the first half-hour return/overnight return and the slope coefficient on the 
interaction term) is more than doubled as compared to that on the normal days. Overall, we 
find strong evidence that the intraday (overnight) time-series momentum is much more 
intensified when the stock market crashes.   
 
15
 The empirical results on the further analyses are consolidated in the Internet Appendix.   
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Second, we examine the time trend of intraday momentum. Gao et al. (2018) observe an 
upward trend indicating that the intraday time-series predictability is more pronounced in 
recent years in the US. We replicate the same rolling window exercise to test whether a similar 
time trend exists in the Chinese stock market. Based on trailing ten-year regressions, we find 
similar evidence that the predictive power of the first half-hour return or overnight return is 
getting stronger in more recent sample periods than earlier sample periods. 
 
8. Conclusion  
Based on a comprehensive high-frequency firm-level dataset that spans from 1996 to 2018, we 
re-test the intraday momentum pattern in the Chinese stock market, the largest emerging 
financial market. Our paper provides a number of new insights which extend the growing 
literature on intraday time-series momentum.  
First, we provide compelling evidence that intraday time-series momentum exists at the firm 
level in the Chinese A-share market. The first half-hour return is a strong positive predictor for 
intraday return near market close (i.e., the last half-hour return).  
Second, by partitioning the first half-hour return into its overnight component and the opening 
half-hour component, we find that the intraday momentum effect stems mainly from its 
overnight return component. This is consistent with the microstructure design in China that 
overnight information is incorporated via trading in the pre-open call auction. In comparison, 
the opening half-hour return is a much weaker price signal, as it probably incorporates multiple 
trading motives (such as informational driven, liquidity driven, and risk aversion). From a 
practical perspective, the overnight return is a more reliable return predictor than its 
predecessor, the first half-hour return.  
Third, we document a strong asymmetric pattern, as the return predictability of the first half-
hour or the overnight return is much stronger subsequent to days with negative jumps than with 
positive jumps. The striking asymmetric post-jump momentum pattern could be reconciled 
with a number of real-world mechanisms (i.e., frictions) such as biased managerial disclosure 
of good news versus bad news and the existence of stringent short-sales impediments. In other 
words, bad news travels slowly as indicated by stronger intraday momentum following large 
pessimist informational shocks.  
Finally, we provide confirmatory evidence that there exists a substantial fraction of late-
informed traders (i.e., approximately 15% of all active traders) who concentrated their trading 
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activity in the latter-half of the trading day, and in particular, near market closure. Consistent 
with the predictions of late-informed trading model, late-informed traders have relatively less 
trading experience and educational background than those who tend to trade in the pre-open 
call market (i.e., early-informed traders). Therefore, the last half-hour trading period stands for 
an important timing for those late-informed to utilize their (late-learned) information. 
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Table 1. Intraday momentum with the first half-hour return 
The table presents the estimation results of the panel regressions with fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 denotes the first half-
hour return calculated using the closing price of the prior trading day and the stock price at 
10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 denotes the penultimate half-hour return calculated 
using the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of the current trading day, 𝛼 denotes the intercept 
term in the regression, 𝑅2  denotes the adjusted R-squared, 𝑂𝑏𝑠.  denotes the number of 
observations in each regression, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the regression. The 
standard error of each coefficient is reported in parenthesis. All values reported are in 
percentages except for 𝑂𝑏𝑠. and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted 
as ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡  1.921***  1.832*** 
(0.0167)  (0.0167) 𝑟14:30,𝑡  6.163*** 6.022*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0366) 𝛼 0.0339*** 0.0324*** 0.0335*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 𝑅2 0.16 0.37 0.51 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224 3,224 3,224 
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Table 2: Subsample analysis of intraday momentum with the first-half hour return 
The table presents the estimation results of the panel regressions with fixed effects. The dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading 
day. Main board includes all A-shares listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and those in the main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. SME 
board includes all A-shares listed in the SME board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. ChiNext includes all A-shares listed in the ChiNext board 
of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 denotes the first half-hour return calculated using the closing price of the prior trading day and the stock 
price at 10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 denotes the penultimate half-hour return calculated using the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of 
the current trading day, 𝛼 denotes the intercept term in the regression, 𝑅2 denotes the adjusted R-squared, 𝑂𝑏𝑠. denotes the number of observations 
in each regression, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the regression. The standard error of each coefficient is reported in parenthesis. All 
values reported are in percentages except for 𝑂𝑏𝑠. and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 Main SME ChiNext 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡  1.73***  1.65*** 2.27***  2.14*** 2.35***  2.20*** 
(0.0205)  (0.0205) (0.037)  (0.037) (0.047)  (0.047) 𝑟14:30,𝑡  5.41*** 5.30***  7.55*** 7.36***  8.63*** 8.40*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0436)  (0.082) (0.082)  (0.117) (0.117) 𝛼 0.0469*** 0.0453*** 0.0465*** 0.0096*** 0.0079*** 0.0093*** -0.0169*** -0.0154*** -0.0158*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 𝑅2 0.12 0.28 0.39 0.24 0.57 0.78 0.31 0.76 1.03 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 5,563,999 5,563,999 5,563,999 1,503,005 1,503,005 1,503,005 720,023 720,023 720,023 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 1,738 1,738 1,738 852 852 852 634 634 634 
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Table 3. Overnight component versus the opening half-hour component 
The table presents the estimation results of the panel regressions with fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 denotes the overnight 
return calculated using the close price of the prior trading day and the opening price at 9:30 of 
the current trading day, 𝑟10:00,𝑡 denotes the opening half-hour return calculated using the stock 
prices at 9:30 and 10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 denotes the penultimate half-hour 
return calculated using the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of the current trading day, 𝛼 denotes 
the intercept term in the regression, 𝑅2  denotes the adjusted R-squared, 𝑂𝑏𝑠.  denotes the 
number of observations in each regression, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the 
regression. The standard error of each coefficient is reported in parenthesis. All values reported 
are in percentages except for 𝑂𝑏𝑠. and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 2.881*** 2.922*** 2.780*** 2.812*** 
(0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0216) 𝑟10:00,𝑡  0.641***  0.566*** 
 (0.0243)  (0.0243) 𝑟14:30,𝑡   6.021*** 6.012*** 
  (0.0365) (0.0365) 𝛼 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 𝑅2 0.22 0.23 0.57 0.58 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 
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Table 4. Overnight return versus alternative opening returns 
The table presents the estimation results of the panel regressions with fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 denotes the overnight 
return calculated using the close price of the prior trading day and the opening price at 9:30 of 
the current trading day. The alternative versions of the opening returns are 𝑟9:35,𝑡, 𝑟9:40,𝑡, 𝑟9:45,𝑡, 𝑟9:50,𝑡, 𝑟9:55,𝑡, and 𝑟10:00,𝑡, which are the intraday returns calculated using the opening price and 
the stock prices at 9:35, 9:40, 9:45, 9:50, 9:55, and 10:00 of the trading day, respectively. 𝑟14:30,𝑡 denotes the penultimate half-hour return calculated using the stock prices at 14:00 and 
14:30 of the current trading day, 𝛼 denotes the intercept term in the regression, 𝑅2 denotes the 
adjusted R-squared, 𝑂𝑏𝑠. denotes the number of observations in each regression, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
denotes the number of firms in the regression. The standard error of each coefficient is reported 
in parenthesis. All values reported are in percentages except for 𝑂𝑏𝑠. and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠. Significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 2.78*** 2.78*** 2.79*** 2.79*** 2.79*** 2.81*** 
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) 𝑟9:35,𝑡 -0.077*      
(0.0424)      𝑟9:40,𝑡  -0.058*     
 (0.0336)     𝑟9:45,𝑡   0.300***    
  (0.0297)    𝑟9:50,𝑡    0.421***   
   (0.0273)   𝑟9:55,𝑡     0.387***  
    (0.0254)  𝑟10:00,𝑡      0.566*** 
     (0.0243) 𝑟14:30,𝑡 6.02*** 6.02*** 6.02*** 6.02*** 6.02*** 6.01*** 
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) 𝛼 0.0352*** 0.0352*** 0.0352*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 𝑅2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 
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Table 5. Summary statistics about jump days 
The table presents the summary statistics of the cumulative daily positive jump return (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑃𝐽), 
cumulative daily negative jump return (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑁𝐽) and cumulative daily return (𝑅𝐸𝑇). It reports 
the mean and standard deviation of the variables, and their values at the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
and 95% quantiles. Ratio denotes the ratio of the number of days with positive jumps / negative 
jumps to the total trading days.  
 Mean Std. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Ratio 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑃𝐽 2.133 1.590 0.521 1.091 1.682 2.627 5.167 14.089% 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑁𝐽 -2.094 1.550 -5.548 -2.691 -1.659 -1.078 -0.549 10.731% 𝑅𝐸𝑇 0.044 3.160 -5.231 -1.511 0.076 1.575 5.336 --- 
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Table 6. Intraday momentum and price jumps 
The table presents the estimation results of the panel regressions with fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 denotes the first half-
hour return, calculated using the closing price of the prior trading day and the stock price at 
10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 denotes the overnight return calculated using the close 
price of the prior trading day and the opening price at 9:30 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 
denotes the penultimate half-hour return, calculated from the stock prices from 14.00 to 14.30 
of the current trading day. 𝑃𝐽 and 𝑁𝐽 are dummy variables, which equal 1 if the prior trading 
day is detected as a positive and a negative jump day, respectively. 𝛼 denotes the intercept term 
in the regression, 𝑅2 denotes the adjusted R-squared, 𝑂𝑏𝑠. denotes the number of observations 
in each regression, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the regression. The standard 
error of each coefficient is reported in parenthesis. All values reported are in percentages except 
for 𝑂𝑏𝑠. and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted as ***, **, and *, 
respectively.  
 Overnight return First half-hour return 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡    1.811*** 1.722*** 
  (0.0214) (0.0214) 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡  2.882*** 2.781***   (0.0292) (0.0292)   𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡   -1.683*** -1.621*** 
  (0.0430) (0.0430) 𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 -2.284*** -2.182***   (0.0540) (0.0539)   𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡   2.642*** 2.522*** 
  (0.0455) (0.0455) 𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 2.532*** 2.401***   (0.0551) (0.0550)   𝑟14:30,𝑡  5.973***  5.971*** 
 (0.0365)  (0.0366) 𝛼 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 𝑅2 0.30 0.65 0.26 0.60 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 
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Table 7. Post-jump Effect 
The table presents the estimation results of the panel regressions with fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 denotes the first half-
hour return, calculated using the closing price of the prior trading day and the stock price at 
10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 denotes the overnight return calculated using the close 
price of the prior trading day and the opening price at 9:30 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 
denotes the penultimate half-hour return, calculated from the stock prices from 14.00 to 14.30 
of the current trading day. 𝑃𝐽 and 𝑁𝐽 are the post-jump dummy which equals 1 over the one-, 
two-, three-day event window subsequent to the positive and negative jump days, respectively. 𝛼 denotes the intercept term in the regression, 𝑅2 denotes the adjusted R-squared, 𝑂𝑏𝑠. denotes 
the number of observations in each regression, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the 
regression. The standard error of each coefficient is reported in parenthesis. All values reported 
are in percentages except for 𝑂𝑏𝑠. and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 Panel A: Overnight Return Panel B: First Half-hour Return 
 One-day Two-day Three-day One-day Two-day Three-day 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡     1.72*** 1.62*** 1.47*** 
   (0.0214) (0.0234) (0.0252) 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡  2.78*** 2.51*** 2.38***    
(0.0292) (0.0260) (0.0264)    𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡    -1.62*** -1.09*** -0.66*** 
   (0.0430) (0.0367) (0.0344) 𝑃𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 -2.18*** -0.99*** -0.59***    
(0.0539) (0.0334) (0.0304)    𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡    2.52*** 2.08*** 1.87*** 
   (0.0455) (0.0386) (0.0357) 𝑁𝐽 × 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 2.40*** 2.09*** 1.86***    
(0.0550) (0.0361) (0.0329)    𝑟14:30,𝑡 5.97*** 5.97*** 5.98*** 5.97*** 5.97*** 5.98*** 
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366) 𝛼 0.041*** 0.0392*** 0.0379*** 0.040*** 0.0378*** 0.0365*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 𝑅2 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 7,787,027 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224 
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Table 8. Individual Investor Accounts and Trading Activities, November 2014 
The table reports the individual investor accounts by types. All investors denote all the 
individual investors who have traded during the sample month; Early-informed refers to the 
individual investors who have traded in the pre-open call auction; Late-informed refers to the 
individual investors who have never traded in the pre-open call auction and the opening half-
hour during the morning session. Panel A reports, for each investor type, the number of 
investors, number of stocks traded, number of total trades, and the ratio of the number of trades 
within each trading period and the total number of trades averaged across days. Panel B reports 
the characteristics of the different investor types. Two-sample 𝑡 -statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted as ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Proportion of the Number of Trades 
 All Investors Early-informed  Late-informed  
Number of investors 120,608 7,896 18,281 
Number of stocks traded 2,411 2,409 2,397 
Number of trades 2,890,937 576,715 127,685 
Proportion of trades (%)    
Pre-open call 0.56 2.81 -- 
>09:30 & <=10:00 21.90 26.32 -- 
>10:00 & <=10:30 14.11 13.95 10.13 
>10:30 & <=11:00 10.70 10.17 9.71 
>11:00 & <=11:30 8.42 8.02 8.57 
>13:00 & <=13:30 10.15 9.55 11.91 
>13:30 & <=14:00 10.04 8.99 12.67 
>14:00 & <=14:30 10.42 9.04 14.68 
>14:30 & <=15:00 13.71 11.15 32.33 
Total 100 100 100 
Panel B. Characteristics by Investor Types 
 All Investors Early-informed  Late-informed  
Proportion with trading 
experience > 10 years 41.59%  47.92%  38.58%  
  
6.34%*** 
(11.06) 
-3.01%*** 
(-7.70) 
Proportion with Bachelor 
degree or above 18.64%  20.71%  18.49%  
  
2.06%*** 
(4.47) 
-0.15% 
(-0.50) 
Proportion of male  
investors 38.98%  47.09%  34.70%  
  
8.11%*** 
(14.14) 
-4.28%*** 
(-11.20) 
Proportion with high-risk 
tolerance 20.95% 27.96% 17.79% 
  
7.01%*** 
(14.08) 
-3.16%*** 
(-10.08) 
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Appendix  
A.1. Variables Definition  
Variables  Description  𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 The last half-hour return calculated using the stock prices at 14:30 and 15:00 
(i.e., market close) of the current trading day.  𝑟1𝑠𝑡 The first half-hour return calculated using the close price of the prior trading day 
and the stock price at 10:00 of the current trading day.  𝑟14:30 The penultimate half-hour return calculated using the stock prices at 14:00 and 
14:30 of the current trading day. 𝑟𝑜𝑣 The overnight return calculated using the close price of the prior trading day and 
the opening price at 9:30 of the current trading day (i.e., close-to-open).  𝑟10:00 The opening half-hour return calculated using the stock prices at 9:30 and 10:00 
of the current trading day, excluding overnight returns.  𝑃𝐽 Positive jump dummy that equals 1 if the prior trading day is a positive jump 
day. 𝑁𝐽 Negative jump dummy that equals 1 if the prior trading day is a negative jump 
day. 𝐹𝐶 Financial crises dummy that equals 1 if the date ranges from 16th October 2007 
to 18th September 2008 or from 12th June 2015 to 29th February 2016.  𝐹𝐶1 Crisis dummy that equals 1 if the date ranges from 16th October 2007 to 18th 
September 2008.  𝐹𝐶2 Crisis dummy that equals 1 if the date ranges from 12th June 2015 to 29th 
February 2016. 
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A.2. Jump Detection Method 
We assume a jump-diffusion process for the underlying (logarithmic) price, 𝑝𝑡, which is of the 
following form:  𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡 + 𝑑𝐽𝑡 
where 𝜇𝑡  is the drift, 𝜎𝑡  the diffusion parameter, 𝑊𝑡  the Brownian motion, and Jt  the jump 
process at time 𝑡 . Given the dynamics of the underlying process, Barndorff-Nielsen and 
Shephard (2004, 2006) states theoretically that the quadratic variation (𝑄𝑉) for the price 
process can be decomposed into a continuous volatility component, known as integrated 
variance (𝐼𝑉), and a jump component. In finite samples, the quadratic variation is usually 
approximated by the realized variance ( 𝑅𝑉 ), a non-parametric measure. For the sample 
counterparty of the integrated variance, we follow the suggestions in Andersen et al. (2012) by 
adopting the 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉 measure, which provides better finite sample robustness (in the case of 
stale prices) and asymptotic efficiency than any Multi-power variation (𝑀𝑃𝑉) measures (such 
as bipower variation). Following Andersen et al. (2012), the two non-parametric measures, 𝑅𝑉 
and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉, are computed as follows:   𝑅𝑉 ≡ ∑ 𝑟𝑗2𝑀𝑗=1  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉 ≡ 𝜋6 − 4√3 + 𝜋 ( 𝑀𝑀 − 2) ∑ 𝑚𝑒𝑑(|𝑟𝑗|, |𝑟𝑗−1|, |𝑟𝑗−2|)2𝑀𝑗=3  
where 𝑟𝑗 is the 𝑗𝑡ℎ intraday return and M the total number of intraday return intervals within a 
single day. For brevity, we have omitted the subscript for the daily indexation.   
Based on the quadratic variation theory (Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard 2004, 2006), the 
difference between 𝑅𝑉 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉 provides a consistent estimation of the jump component 
as M tends to infinity.16 To detect the trading days with significant jump(s), we rely on the ratio 
test statistics (Z) based on its good finite sample property (Huang & Tauchen 2005):  𝑍 = 𝑀12 [𝑅𝑉 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉] × 𝑅𝑉−1[(𝜇1−4 + 2𝜇1−2 − 5) × 𝑚𝑎𝑥{1, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑄 × 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉−2}]12 
 
with the estimator of the higher-order quarticity, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑄, defined as  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑄 ≡ 3𝜋𝑀9𝜋 + 72 − 52√3 ( 𝑀𝑀 − 2) ∑ 𝑚𝑒𝑑(|𝑟𝑗|, |𝑟𝑗−1|, |𝑟𝑗−2|)4𝑀𝑗=3  
In practice, the test needs to be implemented for certain stringent significant levels in order to 
avoid the detection of spurious jumps. Following the literature, we set the significant level to 
α = 0.01% (Beine et al. 2007; Evans 2011; Bajgrowicz et al. 2015). Throughout the paper, we 
adopt the 5-min sampling frequency to alleviate the potential influence of market 
microstructure frictions, which might bias the measures of RV and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉. 
 
The Recursive Intraday Jump Detection Scheme 
 
16
 For the mathematical proof, see theorem 2 in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004).  
34 
 
When the null hypothesis that there is no jump (within a day) is rejected based on the ratio test 
statistic, we apply a sequential intraday jump detection scheme to identify the intraday jumps 
and their timing within the day. That is, if the ratio statistic (𝑍) is significant at day 𝑖, we first 
assume that only one intraday return contributes to the significant 𝑍-stat and then proceed as 
follows: 
Step 1: We record the significant ratio statistic 𝑍𝑖 and extract the series of the 𝑀 intraday 
(geometric) returns {𝑟𝑖,1, 𝑟𝑖,2, . . . , 𝑟𝑖,𝑀} within day 𝑖.  
Step 2: For each intraday return 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ( 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀 ) at day 𝑖, we generate a modified 
series {𝑟𝑖,1, 𝑟𝑖,2, . . . , 𝑟𝑖,𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛, . . . , 𝑟𝑖,𝑀}  by replacing the 𝑗𝑡ℎ  element with the median of the 
intraday returns (denoted as 𝑟𝑖,𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛) in day 𝑖, while keeping the rest unchanged. We then 
recalculate the corresponding 𝑍 -stat (denoted as 𝑍𝑖(𝐽)) for the 𝑀 “new” intraday return series 
to obtain a “sample” of M revised Z-stats {𝑍𝑖(1), 𝑍𝑖(2), … , 𝑍𝑖(𝑀)} for day 𝑖.   
Step 3: We calculate the differences between the original 𝑍-stat and (each of) the new 𝑍-
statistics {𝑍𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖(1), 𝑍𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖(2), … , 𝑍𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖(𝑀)} . The significant jump return 𝑟𝑖,𝐽  is identified 
when the following mathematical expression achieves its maximum.  𝐼{𝑍𝑖>Φ1−𝛼} ( max𝐽∈{1,2,…,𝑀} 𝑍𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖(𝐽)) 
Step 4: We retain the revised 𝑍-stat (𝑍𝑖(𝐽)) identified in Step 3. If 𝑍𝑖(𝐽) is less than the pre-
set critical value, we conclude that there is only one jump on day 𝑖. However, if it still exceeds 
the critical value, we then replace the identified jump observation with 𝑟𝑖,𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛, and start over 
again from Step 1 to Step 4 to identify the second intraday jump on day 𝑖. 
The above recursive procedure continues until all the intraday jumps within day 𝑖 are identified. 
In this way, we are able to extract all the intraday jumps during the sample period. Similar 
sequential jump detection methods are also used in Andersen et al. (2010), Jiang and Oomen 
(2008) and Jiang et al. (2011). The major difference between their procedure and ours is that 
we rely on the 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉 measure for the jump tests, while they use bipower variation or other 
alternatives to approximate the integrated variance in finite sample. To ensure that the 
identified jump returns are not spurious due to bid-ask bounces, we follow the additional 
procedure of Jiang and Zhu (2017) by filtering out the jump returns which are less than twice 
the tick size.    
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Table A1. Summary Statistics of the Chinese A-Share Market 
The table provides the breakdown of the summary statistics of the Chinese A-shares. Main board includes all A-shares listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and A-shares in the Main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. SME board includes all A-shares listed in the SME board of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. ChiNext includes all A-shares listed in the ChiNext board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Total market capitalization 
is measured in billions of Chinese yuan, total number of shares outstanding is measured in billions, and total trading volume is measured in 100 
millions of Chinese yuan.  
 Number of Stocks Market Cap. (× 109) Shares Outstanding (× 109) Trading Volume  (× 108) 
 Main SME ChiNext Main SME ChiNext Main SME ChiNext Main SME ChiNext 
2004 1311 38  2.74 1.09  1.43 0.25  4.28 1.56  
2005 1305 50  2.40 0.96  1.66 0.44  4.86 2.61  
2006 1296 102  6.64 1.98  2.51 0.54  11.97 2.91  
2007 1305 202  24.06 5.27  3.56 0.63  26.72 4.04  
2008 1308 273  8.74 2.30  4.99 0.95  17.37 4.36  
2009 1315 327 36 17.01 5.16 4.47 10.38 1.16 0.18 35.99 10.04 1.07 
2010 1357 531 153 15.43 3.04 1.31 13.66 1.33 0.33 27.52 7.64 2.62 
2011 1393 646 281 12.36 2.22 0.89 15.13 1.74 0.51 21.00 5.77 2.71 
2012 1416 701 355 13.06 2.32 0.94 16.18 2.12 0.68 18.45 7.24 4.16 
2013 1412 701 355 12.66 3.64 2.32 19.39 2.93 1.21 25.97 11.76 8.55 
2014 1454 732 406 19.83 4.92 3.22 19.89 3.49 1.69 39.78 15.46 9.94 
2015 1540 776 492 23.05 8.99 6.52 20.94 4.51 2.38 87.79 32.74 20.20 
2016 1642 822 570 20.80 7.80 5.36 21.22 5.43 2.98 39.22 25.03 16.68 
2017 1854 903 710 21.35 7.88 4.30 19.95 6.18 3.08 33.66 19.28 12.44 
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Table A2. Individual stock regression with first half-hour returns 
The table presents the aggregated results of the firm-by-firm time-series regression with Newey-West adjusted standard errors. All denotes all the 
stocks, Main denotes all A-shares listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in the Main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, SME denotes 
all A-shares listed in the SME board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and ChiNext all A-shares listed in the ChiNext board of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. The dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 denotes the first half-hour return calculated using the close 
price of the prior trading day and the stock price at 10:00 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 denotes the penultimate half-hour return calculated 
using the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of the current trading day. Mean (Median) denotes the average (median) value of the coefficients (scaled 
by 100) aggregated from individual stock regressions. 𝑡-stat. reports the mean value of the Newey West adjusted 𝑡-statistics from individual stock 
regression. > 0 denotes the percentage of positive coefficients. > 0 ∗,  > 0 ∗∗, and  > 0 ∗∗∗ denote the percentage of positive coefficients that are 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 𝑅2 denotes the adjusted R-squared, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the regression.  
 
 All Main SME ChiNext 
 𝛼  𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 𝛼 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 𝛼 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 𝛼 𝑟1𝑠𝑡,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 
Mean 0.01 1.87 6.70 0.04 1.70 5.75 -0.01 2.06 7.25 -0.03 2.09 8.44 
Median 0.02 1.93 6.60 0.04 1.75 5.73 0.00 2.17 7.67 -0.03 2.17 8.42 𝑡-stat. 1.32 1.58 1.70 2.59 1.55 1.74 0.19 1.59 1.66 -0.82 1.61 1.57 > 0 63.40 90.42 89.73 79.06 90.16 88.55 51.48 90.34 89.46 32.65 90.69 91.32 > 0 ∗ 46.12 60.86 63.93 64.38 59.26 63.81 29.86 61.58 63.34 15.30 63.25 61.83 > 0 ∗∗ 42.15 48.88 53.44 60.53 47.70 54.72 25.03 49.18 52.47 12.62 50.00 48.11 > 0 ∗∗∗ 38.83 38.52 43.98 57.42 38.09 46.61 21.41 38.31 42.15 9.46 38.33 36.75 𝑅2 1.13   0.90   1.41   1.65   𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224   1,738   911   634   
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Table A3. Individual stock regression with overnight returns 
The table presents the aggregated results of the firm-by-firm time-series regression with Newey-West adjusted standard errors. All denotes all the 
stocks, Main denotes all A-shares listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in the Main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, SME denotes 
all A-shares listed in the SME board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and ChiNext all A-shares listed in the ChiNext board of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. The dependent variable is the last half-hour return of the trading day. 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 denotes the overnight return calculated using the close price 
of the prior trading day and the opening price at 9:30 of the current trading day, 𝑟14:30,𝑡 denotes the penultimate half-hour return calculated using 
the stock prices at 14:00 and 14:30 of the current trading day. Mean (Median) denotes the average (median) value of the coefficients (scaled by 
100) aggregated from individual stock regressions. 𝑡-stat. reports the mean value of the Newey West adjusted 𝑡-statistics from individual stock 
regression. > 0 denotes the percentage of positive coefficients. > 0 ∗,  > 0 ∗∗, and  > 0 ∗∗∗ denote the percentage of positive coefficients that are 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 𝑅2 denotes the adjusted R-squared, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 denotes the number of firms in the regression.  
 
 All Main SME ChiNext 
 𝛼 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 𝛼 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 𝛼 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 𝛼 𝑟𝑜𝑣,𝑡 𝑟14:30,𝑡 
Mean 0.02 2.81 6.70 0.04 2.66 5.75 0.00 3.10 7.25 -0.03 2.78 8.44 
Median 0.02 2.78 6.59 0.04 2.64 5.74 0.01 3.13 7.69 -0.03 2.68 8.43 𝑡-stat. 1.43 1.78 1.72 2.70 1.87 1.75 0.30 1.77 1.68 -0.73 1.54 1.58 > 0 64.80 92.21 89.76 80.15 92.29 88.49 53.57 92.86 89.68 33.75 90.69 91.32 > 0 ∗ 47.83 66.87 64.05 65.48 68.58 63.92 32.27 66.74 63.23 17.51 61.36 62.30 > 0 ∗∗ 43.61 55.27 53.82 61.91 58.29 55.29 26.89 54.34 52.47 13.56 46.53 48.42 > 0 ∗∗∗ 40.17 45.13 44.54 58.98 47.64 47.12 22.39 45.12 42.81 10.57 35.80 37.22 𝑅2 1.18   0.96   1.47   1.64   𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 3,224   1,738   911   634   
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Table A4. Logit Regression Model 
The table reports the logit regression model. The dependent variable is the binary variable that 
equals one if the trader is early-informed (late-informed) and zero otherwise. Experience 
denotes whether the investor has trading experience of 10 years or longer, Degree denotes 
whether the investor a bachelor degree or higher, Risk Tolerance denotes whether the investor 
is with high risk tolerance or not, and Male denotes whether the investor is male or not. The 
standard error of each coefficient is reported in parenthesis. 𝑂𝑏𝑠.  denotes the number of 
observations. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted as ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 𝑃(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 = 1) 𝑃(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 = 1) 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 0.222*** -0.117*** (0.0237) (0.0166) 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 0.335*** -0.107*** (0.0313) (0.0218) 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 0.335*** -0.196*** (0.0265) (0.0210) 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 0.399*** -0.217*** (0.0255) (0.0178) 𝛼 -3.074*** -1.536*** (0.0224) (0.0134) 𝑂𝑏𝑠. 120,608 120,608 
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